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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
JAMES SCOTT WALLBERG, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 981871-CA 
Priority No. 2 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Pursuant to order of this Court dated December 28, 2000, the State submits this 
Second Supplemental Brief in response to the Second Supplemental Brief of Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL 
In State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278,282 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
the trial court should appoint counsel and provide necessary transcripts if payment of such 
by a defendant "would place an undue hardship on the defendant's ability to provide the 
basic necessities of life for the defendant and the defendant's family." The court in Vincent 
held that in making that determination, trial courts should consider: 
"employment status and earning capacity; financial aid from family or friends, 
financial assistance from state and federal programs; [the defendant's] 
necessary living expenses and liabilities; [the defendant's] unencumbered 
assets, or any disposition thereof; and, the relative amount of court costs to be 
waived." 
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Id. at 283-84 {quoting Kelsey v. Hanson, 818 P.2d 590, 591-92 (Utah App. 1991)) (brackets 
in original and footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court refused to further define indigency, 
deeming it "unwise to rush to factual specificity as to what constitutes legal 'indigency.'" 
Id. at 282. In "loosely defining] indigency," the high court "creat[ed], in the terms of the 
metaphor used in Pena, a rather broad pasture for trial judges applying the law of indigency 
to the facts before them." Id. A review of the facts before the trial court here reveals that 
its decision was well within that "rather broad pasture." 
The trial court here learned that as a result of a disability, defendant received a social 
security check for $928 each month. R. 09; R. 174: 5-6. Defendant listed eight dependents 
in his application for court-appointed counsel. R. 09. Upon inquiry at the hearing, the court 
learned that the eight dependents included seven children and defendant. R. 174: 5. When 
the court asked defendant whether he was currently paying for the support of those children, 
defendant responded in the affirmative. R. 174: 5. Upon further inquiry, however, and after 
the prosecutor stated her belief that some, if not all, of the children were in the State's 
custody, defendant conceded that his children were in fact receiving separate payments from 
the federal government under his disability benefits for their support. See R. 174: 7-8. 
In the Second Supplemental Brief of Appellant (Supp.2d), defendant contends that 
under federal law, "an incarcerated person may lose all Federal benefit payments during his 
incarceration, [and] thus even had [he] been able to persuade an attorney to represent him and 
take payments, he would likely have lost his sole source of income once imprisoned." 
Supp.2d at 1 -2. Defendant fails to cite any authority supporting that proposition, nor is there 
2 
any evidence in the record suggesting that he did not continue to receive those benefits 
through trial and beyond. See Supp.2d at 1-2. Federal law in fact provides that a social 
security recipient loses his eligibility for monthly disability benefits only ifhe is incarcerated 
or imprisoned as a result of a conviction or if he is otherwise confined after being adjudged 
incompetent to stand trial. 42 U.S.C. § 402(x)(l)(A) (1991 & Supp. II1994). Accordingly, 
defendant would have been eligible to receive at least five more monthly disability payments 
benefits. See R. 73-74.1 
The court also considered the cash available to defendant at the time. In his 
application for court-appointed counsel, defendant listed $600 as cash on hand or in banks. 
R. 09. However, at the indigency hearing on May 16,1995, the prosecutor advised the court 
that jail personnel had informed her they had inventoried more than $800 in cash from his 
wallet at the time of his arrest. See R. 174: 6. When questioned about the discrepancy, 
defendant conceded that "[i]t could have been approximately that" because he received his 
disability checks on the third day of the month. R. 174: 6. 
In support of his application, defendant advised the court that he had to pay for food 
and rent and that he was required " to travel to California and to medical physicians for [his] 
disability." R. 174: 8-9. He also asserted that he was required to pay his own prescription 
drugs which "sometimes" cost him three to four hundred dollars a month. R. 174: 8. 
Defendant did not, however, assert that he was required to pay that amount at that time, nor 
*In fact, defendant was not sentenced to prison until some three years later because 
he absconded from the initial sentencing. R. 73-74, 77. 
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did he identify any other immediate expenses. See R. 174: 8. Nevertheless, and apparently 
still uncertain as to defendant's financial responsibilities to his children, the trial court was 
prepared to appoint counsel. SeeR. 174: 13. 
As the trial judge began to appoint counsel, however, a public defender present at the 
hearing, who had represented defendant in the past and who was aware of his financial 
situation, intervened. R. 174:13. The public defender stated that defendant had a Medicaid 
card for medical expenses. R. 174: 14. He also confirmed that defendant's monthly 
disability check was not used for child support and he represented that defendant has "always 
had income." R. 174:13. Defendant countered, volunteering for the first time that Medicare 
paid for 85 percent of doctors visits and the "hospital co-charges." R. 174: 14. 
After hearing from the public defender, the trial court concluded that defendant was 
not entitled to court-appointed counsel. R. 174: 14. When defendant protested, the court 
observed that appropriate arrangements could be made with an attorney for payment. R. 174: 
14. Defendant now contends that the court's decision was improper because the trial court 
incorrectly stated that an attorney could place a lien on defendant's social security check. 
Supp.2d at 1. Defendant cites to no authority supporting that proposition. See Supp.2d at 
1. In any event, the court's reference to such a lien was merely used as an example for the 
court's general observation that procedures existed to assure attorneys of payment. See R. 
174: 14. 
Defendant also complains that it would have been difficult for him to locate an 
attorney while he was incarcerated. Supp.2d at 1-2. That claim is not substantiated by any 
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record evidence and has never been considered as a factor in determining indigency. Indeed, 
the difficulty in locating counsel because a defendant is incarcerated is irrelevant to 
defendant's ability to pay for counsel. Moreover, while incarceration may hamper a 
defendant's ability to secure an attorney, it does not prevent him from doing so, nor does it 
preclude him from securing an attorney with the assistance of friends or family. 
Finally, defendant observes that the monthly disability check fell below 150% of the 
United States poverty level referenced in Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-202(3)(ii) (1999). 
Supp.2d at 4. That statute, however, was not in effect at the time of the hearing and therefore 
has no application. Moreover, based on defendant's figures, his annual disability benefits 
were only $70 shy of exceeding 150% of the poverty level. See Supp.2d at 4. 
* * * 
Given defendant's monthly income of $928, his available cash on hand of $800, and 
his failure to substantiate any current expenses of an extraordinary nature, the trial court 
correctly navigated the "rather broad pasture" in "applying the law of indigency to the facts." 
Vincent, 883 P.2d at 282. As noted above, the expenses identified by defendant were vague 
and unsubstantiated. Defendant also failed to provide the information that was fatal in 
Vincent, conceding that he "d[id] [not] know how much counsel costs." R. 174: 14. As 
observed in Vincent, where no evidence is introduced showing the cost of counsel, "it is 
impossible to determine a defendant's ability to pay those expenses." Vincent, 883 P.2d at 
284. Accordingly, defendant failed to meet his burden in establishing indigency, and absent 
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that evidence, the reviewing court cannot assume defendant was unable to pay for counsel. 
See id. at 283-84.2 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in the State's other briefs, the State respectfully 
requests that the Court affirm the conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this b f day of March, 2001. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
-REY S. GRAY 
LSSISTANT ATTORNEY 6ENERAL 
Attorneys for Appellee, State of Utah 
 
2^  We also learn from the transcript of the indigency hearing that the trial court's 
previous appointments of counsel were subject to an assessment for attorneys fees if the 
court determined later that defendant was able to pay for counsel. See R. 174: 9. 
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